

## ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES EFFORT IN CURBING BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN ADAMAWA STATE FROM 2013-2023

Bassi, Hassan Danladi<sup>1</sup> and Minnessi Kibikiwa Glenn<sup>2</sup> (*Ph.D*)

<sup>1,2</sup>Adamawa state University, Mubi Faculty of Administration and Management Sciences,  
Department of Public Administration, Adamawa State.

[danladibassihassan@gmail.com](mailto:danladibassihassan@gmail.com)<sup>1</sup>, [kibikiwa788@adsu.edu.ng](mailto:kibikiwa788@adsu.edu.ng)<sup>2</sup>

DOI: 10.64290/aijpam.v3.i3.21

### **Abstract**

*This study critically examines the efforts of anti-corruption agencies in curbing bureaucratic corruption in Adamawa State, Nigeria. Quantitative research design is adopted and data were collected from a sample of 380 respondents selected through random sampling techniques. Descriptive statistics is adopted for analysis. Structural equation modelling (SEM) to explore the complex relationships among key variables influencing anti-corruption effectiveness. The core variables investigated include strategies employed, policy and institutional frameworks, stakeholder collaboration and cooperation, challenges faced, and the level of bureaucratic corruption. The SEM results reveal significant relationships: a robust policy and institutional framework positively influence the development of effective strategies; strategies, in turn, significantly foster collaboration among stakeholders; and both strategies and collaboration contribute positively to the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. Conversely, the study identifies challenges faced such as resistance, resource constraints, and political interference as significant barriers that diminish anti-corruption effectiveness. Additionally, higher levels of bureaucratic corruption negatively impact the success of anti-corruption measures. The findings underscore the critical importance of strengthening policy frameworks, adopting targeted strategies, promoting stakeholder collaboration, and addressing operational challenges to enhance anti-corruption outcomes. These insights provide valuable guidance for policymakers and anti-corruption practitioners aiming to improve governance and reduce corruption in Adamawa State and similar contexts. The study contributes to the existing literature by elucidating the interplay of structural, strategic, and operational factors in anti-corruption efforts, highlighting areas for targeted interventions and policy reforms.*

**Keywords:** *Anti-Corruption, Bureaucratic Corruption, Public Sector Accountability, Governance Reforms and Adamawa-State*

### **1.0 Introduction**

Corruption is a global malaise that affects every nation, has taken a particularly pervasive hold in Nigeria. Its alarming prevalence continues to hinder the country's pursuit for rapid socio-economic and political development, making it a pressing issue of public concern. Corruption has also been eroding the socio-economic and political foundations of the country. Moreover, corruption is undermining our nascent democracy and legitimacy of government by subverting formal processes

of governance. This has reduced peoples trust in their institutions and leaders. Similarly, corruption in elections and in electoral bodies has reduced accountability and representation in policy making. In public administration, it has resulted to ineffective service delivery (African Diaspora Initiative, 2023).

One of the major challenges to governance particularly in the twilight of the twentieth and dawn of the twenty-first centuries is corruption. The dimension of the vice has over the years attracted global attention. This has placed the fight against corruption as a priority on most governments' reform agenda. The significance of corruption as a factor that adversely affects the quality of governance has been universally recognised (Vitta, 2020). It is for this reason that the focus of this work is on and tenor of the fight against corruption which attracted renewed vigor and come under fresh scrutiny as part of a broader good governance agenda. This is partly due to the rise in the incidence of corruption with impunity and mounting evidence of its multi-dimensional impact (African Development Bank (AfDB) 2024).

Nigeria is one of the most blessed nations on earth, bestowed with vast human and natural resources. These resources if properly harnessed would have developed the country and Nigeria will rank among the top most developed nations of the world. Ironically, despite these abundant resources, Nigeria is still considered among the comity of nations tagged as underdeveloped or sometimes described as developing. Consequently, life expectancy and other indicators of development and wellbeing are not encouraging as opposed to what obtains in the developed countries.

In recognition of corruptive tendencies in Nigeria, the Obasanjo administration established different anti-corruption institutions such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC). The institutionalization of these anti-graft agencies, at the inception of Obasanjo's administration, raised the hope of Nigerians with the expectation that the changes will bring to book corrupt public officials and also act as a deterrent on others (Ijewereme, 2021). Unfortunately, these programs and strategies made little impact in the war against corruption in the face of enormous political corruption in the Nigerian public sector. Despite the efforts of anti-corruption agencies, bureaucratic corruption remains a major problem in Nigeria. This is particularly true in the North East region, which has been ravaged by conflict and insurgency. The war in the North East has created a climate of impunity, which has made it easier for corrupt officials to operate with impunity.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Corruption remains a persistent and deeply rooted governance challenge in Nigeria, particularly in the form of bureaucratic corruption, where public officials exploit their positions for personal gain. Despite the establishment of anti-corruption institutions and legal frameworks such as the ICPC, EFCC, and key legislative acts, corruption continues to thrive within the federal public service, indicating systemic weaknesses in enforcement, institutional independence, and overall effectiveness.

The problem is especially severe in North Eastern Nigeria, where prolonged conflict, insecurity, and weak institutional structures have created an environment conducive to corruption and impunity. In this fragile context, public officials often take advantage of limited oversight and the urgency of humanitarian and reconstruction efforts to engage in practices such as fund diversion, procurement fraud, and employment irregularities. These actions have undermined service delivery, eroded public trust, and contributed to the region's continued underdevelopment. Ultimately, the persistence of bureaucratic corruption in the North East not only reflects the limited reach of national anti-corruption strategies but also poses a serious threat to peacebuilding, reconstruction, and democratic stability. Despite constitutional mandates to eliminate corruption, practical outcomes remain inadequate, highlighting a significant gap between policy intentions and realities on the ground.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

The main objective of the study is to examine the role of anticorruption agencies in curbing bureaucratic corruption in Adamawa State. The specific objectives of the study are to:

- i. examine government policies and institutional framework that support anti-corruption agencies effort in curbing bureaucratic corruption in Adamawa State;
- ii. examine the effectiveness of strategies employed by anti-corruption agencies in curbing bureaucratic corruption in Adamawa State;

### **1.4 Research Questions**

The study answers the following research question at the end of the study.

- i. What are the government policies and institutional framework that support anti-corruption agencies effort in curbing bureaucratic corruption in Adamawa State?
- ii. How effective are anti-corruption agencies in curbing bureaucratic corruption in Adamawa State?

### **1.5 Research Hypotheses**

**H<sub>1</sub>1:** government policies and institutional framework has no significant impact on supporting anti-corruption agencies effort in curbing bureaucratic corruption in Adamawa State.

**H<sub>1</sub>2:** the strategies employed by anti-corruption agencies do not have significant impact on curbing bureaucratic corruption in Adamawa State.

## **2.0 Literature Review**

### **2.1 Corruption**

Corruption is a social phenomenon that is difficult to define, and it does not have a universally accepted definition. The definition varies depending on the inclination of the scholar and perception of the concept. Andrig and Fjelstad cited in Mohammed (2021) are of the opinion that corruption is a "complex and multifaceted phenomenon with multiple causes and effects, as it takes on various forms and contexts". Similarly, Tanzi (2020) is of the view that while it is hard to define corruption, the crisis that is linked to corruption is not difficult to identify. The United Nations Global

Programme Against Corruption (GPAC) defines political corruption as the “abuse of power for private gain.” In a similar vein, TI also put forward a lucid definition of the concept as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” Waziri (2021) views corruption as a pervasion or a change from the generally accepted law or rules for personal benefit.

Azelama (2023) defines corruption as any action or omission enacted by a member of an organization, which is against the rules, regulations, norms, and ethics of the organization, and the purpose is to meet the selfish end of the member at the detriment of the organization. The World Bank (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2024) defines corruption as “the abuse of office for private gains.” Public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. Agbu (2020) observes that public office can be abused for selfish gain even if bribery does not take place. This implies that political corruption could be defined in the form of patronage, election rigging, and voters register manipulation, favoritism in the award of contract, procurement scam, tribalism and nepotism in recruitment and promotion, unfair punishment/sanctions for public officials.

Ekumankama (2023) reiterating the views of Atlas (2024) and Brooks (2021), identifies three common elements in the definition of corruption. These are: abuse of power; violation of official or judiciary duty; and intentional design for personal gain against the interest of the public or individuals. These acts usually take place in secrecy. It is line with the above definition that Njokuwu (2023) defines corruption “as taking undue personal advantage of one’s position against the perceive common good of society.” From a narrower perspective, Onaiyekan (2020) sees public corruption as largely referring to the misuse of public funds or the appropriation of resources meant for the community into private pocket. While Osoba (2024) defines it “as an anti-social behaviour conferring improper benefits contrary to legal and moral norms and which undermines the authorities capacity to secure the welfare of the state.” to the Jamaican Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (2020), corruption is simply the misuse of public office for private gain for the benefit of the holder of the office or some third party.

Aduda (2023) in his empirical study defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. He explains that public office is abused when officials accepts, solicits or extorts a bribe and when private agents offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profits. Others include patronage and nepotism, theft of state assets or diversion of state revenues among others. Bribery was however found to be the most common form of corruption known to the respondents of the study. Bello - Imam (2024) reiterates the views of Bayley (2021) and Nye (2020) in defining corruption as a deviation from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding motives (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary exercise of certain types of private regarding influence which include bribery; nepotism; and misappropriation. Corruption to Bayley (2021) however, transcends personal monetary gain. In view of this definitional crisis, it is inevitable to settle for an operational definition of corruption which according to Bello - Iman (2024) is any

induced or un-induced behaviour within a complex or private organization to falsify its integrity, purpose, virtue and ethics. He also identifies five different types of corruption as; political, economic, bureaucratic, judicial and moral corruption.

## **2.2 Anti-corruption Agencies**

The word ‘corruption’ refers to an unethical behaviour which runs counter to the accepted social norms and moral values. It could also be described as an act involving dishonesty, illegality and non-conformity with accepted standard of behaviour. And such an act or behaviour has its main aim; the return for financial or material benefit, either for the person committing the act or on behalf of any other person (Igbaekemen et al, 2020). The word ‘anti’ implies or basically means ‘opposed to’. ‘Agency’ on the other hand refers to an administrative department or division (of mostly government) that is responsible for a particular function. Bringing the meaning of these three words together, anti-corruption agencies could be described as the division or administrative departments of government that is opposed to unruly or unethical behaviours/acts that are perpetrated by individuals/persons for selfish reasons.

## **2.3 Bureaucratic corruption**

Bureaucratic corruption is a type of corruption that occurs within the north eastern Nigeria. It occurs when public officials abuse their power for personal gain, such as by demanding bribes, awarding contracts to unqualified individuals, or embezzling public funds. Bureaucratic corruption can have a devastating impact on a country's development, as it can lead to inefficiency, waste, and a decline in the quality of public services (Olaniyan, 2020). Nigeria is one of the most corrupt countries in the world. According to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, Nigeria ranked 149th out of 180 countries in 2022. This means that Nigeria is perceived to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index, 2022).

Bureaucratic corruption is a pervasive and detrimental form of corruption that takes root within the confines of the public sector. It manifests when government officials entrusted with the responsibilities of administering public resources and services misuse their positions for personal gain. This abuse of power may take on various forms, including soliciting bribes from individuals or businesses, bestowing government contracts upon unqualified or politically connected individuals, or even siphoning public funds into private pockets (Olowu, 2021). The impact of bureaucratic corruption is far-reaching and profoundly negative. It goes beyond the immediate financial losses, as it creates an environment of mistrust, hinders economic progress, and erodes the quality of public services. When public officials prioritize personal enrichment over the public good, it leads to inefficiency, misallocation of resources, and a general decline in the effectiveness of government institutions (Olaniyan, 2020). Citizens are often the ones who suffer the most, experiencing reduced access to essential services like healthcare, education, and infrastructure, as resources are diverted away from their intended purposes.

## **2.4 Theoretical Framework**

The study adopts Institutional Theory, as advanced by Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, to explain corruption in the public sector. The theory emphasizes how formal structures (laws, rules, and anti-corruption agencies) and informal norms (culture, patronage, and practices) shape behaviour within institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 2021; Scott, 2021). It argues that corruption persists when institutions are weak, lack transparency, or are poorly enforced, even where anti-corruption frameworks exist (Luo, 2024). Institutional theory is particularly relevant to Nigeria, where concentration of power, weak regulatory oversight, and political interference create opportunities for corruption. It explains how corrupt practices become institutionalized and why anti-corruption efforts often fail due to systemic and structural weaknesses rather than absence of legal frameworks (Debski et al., 2020; Stensota et al., 2022).

The theory also highlights that institutional effectiveness depends on clear rules, enforcement capacity, organizational norms, and inter-agency cooperation. It provides a basis for analysing government policies, anti-corruption strategies, collaboration among institutions, and the challenges faced by agencies, especially in fragile contexts like Adamawa State. However, Institutional Theory has been criticized for being more descriptive than predictive and for underestimating individual agency and dynamic political changes (Eisenhardt, 2020; Tolbert & Zucker, 2020). Despite these limitations, it remains a useful framework for understanding how institutional structures, legitimacy, and socio-political conditions shape the persistence of bureaucratic corruption.

## **3.0 Methodology**

### **3.1 Research Design**

This study employs a quantitative, cross-sectional survey design supported by documentary analysis. The design enables the collection of standardized data from a representative sample, allowing for statistical generalization on public perceptions of anti-corruption institutions, particularly the roles of the ICPC and EFCC in Nigeria's North East. Data are collected using structured questionnaires due to their efficiency and cost-effectiveness (Creswell, 2020). The cross-sectional approach captures data at a single point in time, providing a snapshot of current perceptions without tracking changes over time.

### **3.2 Population and Sample Size**

The study population comprised staff of two anti-corruption agencies and residents of three selected Local Government Areas in Adamawa State. This included 44 agency staff (23 from ICPC and 21 from EFCC) and a combined population of 720,000 residents from Yola North, Mubi North, and Numan, giving a total population of 720,044. This population informed the sample size and questionnaire distribution, ensuring representation of both institutional staff and community members. The Krejcie and Morgan (1970) sampling technique was used to determine the appropriate sample size.

Assumptions:

- Confidence level: 95% ( $Z = 1.96$ )
- Margin of error: 5% ( $d = 0.05$ )
- Proportion ( $p$ ): 0.5 (most conservative estimate)

Using the formula:

$$X = \frac{Z^2 * p * (1 - p)}{d^2}$$

$$X = \frac{(1.96)^2 * 0.5 * (1 - 0.5)}{(0.05)^2} = \frac{3.8416 * 0.5 * (1 - 0.5)}{0.0025} = \frac{0.9604}{0.0025} = 384.16$$

Now, compute the sample size  $n$ , with respect to ICPC and EFCC

$$n = \frac{N * X}{X + N - 1} = \frac{44 * 384.16}{384 + 44 - 1} = \frac{16902.9}{427.16} = 39.58$$

Final sample size: approximately 40

Compute the sample size  $n$ , with respect to 720,000 population of the financial unit of local Government secretariate of 3 selected LGAs

$$n = \frac{N * X}{X + N - 1} = \frac{118 * 384.16}{384 + 21 - 1} = \frac{45330.88}{404.16} = 385$$

To ensure the reliability and accuracy of the data while minimizing potential bias in the sampling process, the proportion of financial unit of local Government secretariate of 3 selected local governments in each senatorial district will first be calculated. This will be done by dividing the total number of each financial unit by the total population of the 3 financial units, and then multiplying sample size.

### 3.3 Sampling Technique

The study adopted a random sampling technique, selecting participants based on relevant criteria such as institutional affiliation, residency, age (18+), and willingness to participate. Eligible respondents included ICPC and EFCC staff and residents of Yola North, Mubi North, and Numan. Random sampling ensured that all eligible individuals had an equal chance of selection, reducing bias and enhancing representativeness. This approach enabled the collection of reliable data reflecting both institutional and community perspectives (Kothari, 2021).

### 3.4 Method of Data Analysis

The study utilized both descriptive statistics and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) for data analysis. Descriptive tools such as percentages, means, standard deviations, tables, and charts were used to summarize the data. SEM was applied to test relationships between variables, offering advantages like handling multiple variables simultaneously and reducing measurement errors through Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2020). Prior to the structural model, CFA was conducted to assess the validity, reliability, and one-dimensionality of the measurement model by linking observed questionnaire items to latent constructs.

### 3.5 Test of Model Fitness

The validity of the Structural Equation Model (SEM) is assessed by evaluating its goodness of fit. A model is considered a good fit if the Chi-square test statistic is not significant, and at least one incremental fit index, such as the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), or Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), meets the specified criteria.

**Index Table**

| S/N | Category         | Index Name                  | Acceptable Threshold |
|-----|------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| 1   | Absolute Fit     | Chi-square ( $\chi^2$ )     | $p > 0.05$           |
|     |                  | Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) | $GFI > 0.90$         |
| 2   | Incremental Fit  | CFI                         | $CFI > 0.95$         |
|     |                  | RMSEA                       | $RMSEA \leq 0.06$    |
|     |                  | TLI                         | $TLI > 0.90$         |
| 3   | Parsimonious Fit | $\chi^2/df$                 | $\chi^2/df < 5.0$    |

### 3.6 Model Specification

The study used Bureaucratic Corruption Level (BUC) as the dependent variable, while the independent variables include Policy and Institutional Framework (PIF), Strategies Employed (STE), Collaboration and Cooperation (CCO), Challenges Faced (CHF), and the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Measures (EAC). The relationships among these variables are illustrated in the specified structural models:

### 3.7 Structural Model

The structural model defines the relationships between the latent dependent variables (BUC), and the independent variable (PIF, STE, CCO, CHF, and EAC).

$$\eta = \beta\eta + \Gamma\xi + \zeta \text{-----}(3.14)$$

$\eta = \eta_1, \eta_2, \eta_3$  represents the dependent variables (BUC).

$\xi =$  (PIF, STE, CCO, CHF, and EAC) represents the independent variables.

$\beta =$  represents the coefficients for the relationships among the dependent variables.

$\Gamma =$  represents the coefficient that captures the Anticorruption Agencies Effort in Curbing Bureaucratic Corruption In Adamawa State.

### 4.0 Result

The combined demographic data shows that the majority of respondents are male (57.41%), indicating a slightly male-dominated sample, though females are also well represented. In terms of age distribution, most respondents fall within the 25-39 years range, suggesting a predominantly

youthful and economically active population. Regarding marital status, a significant proportion of respondents are single (61.38%), followed by married individuals (32.28%), while divorced respondents constitute a small minority. This reflects a sample largely made up of unmarried individuals, which may influence perspectives and social experiences.

In terms of educational attainment, the largest group holds a degree (43.82%), indicating a relatively educated sample. However, a considerable proportion also possesses only primary education (26.97%), highlighting diversity in educational backgrounds. Therefore, the demographic profile reveals a young, moderately educated, and slightly male-dominated population, which provides important context for interpreting the study's findings.

**Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents**

| Variable        | Category         | Frequency | Percentage (%) |
|-----------------|------------------|-----------|----------------|
| Gender          | Male             | 217       | 57.41          |
|                 | Female           | 161       | 42.59          |
| Age             | 25–32 years      | 122       | 32.28          |
|                 | 33–39 years      | 182       | 28.14          |
|                 | 40–46 years      | 38        | 10.05          |
|                 | 47 years & above | 36        | 9.52           |
| Marital Status  | Single           | 232       | 61.38          |
|                 | Married          | 122       | 32.28          |
|                 | Divorced         | 24        | 6.35           |
| Education Level | Primary          | 96        | 26.97          |
|                 | Secondary        | 48        | 13.48          |
|                 | Degree           | 156       | 43.82          |
|                 | Others           | 56        | 15.73          |

**Source:** Field Survey (2022/2025)

Table 2 presents the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and reliability results for six constructs (PIF, STE, CCO, CHF, EAC, and BUC). The model fit indices indicate a good overall fit, as RMSEA values are below 0.10 (with EAC showing the best fit at 0.050), while GFI, AGFI, CFI, TLI, and NFI values are generally above 0.90, reflecting strong model adequacy. Most Chi-square/df ratios are within acceptable limits, although EAC is slightly higher but still tolerable.

Reliability results show high internal consistency across all constructs, with Cronbach's alpha values exceeding the 0.70 threshold (ranging from 0.796 to 0.966). Overall, the findings confirm that the

measurement model is both valid and reliable, indicating that the constructs are well-measured and suitable for further analysis.

*Table 2: Individual Confirmatory Factor Analysis CFA (Model Fit) and Reliability Test*

| Variables  | RMSEA | GFI   | AGFI  | CFI   | TLI   | NFI   | CHISQ/DF | PV    | Cronbach $\alpha$ |
|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------|-------|-------------------|
| <b>PIF</b> | 0.064 | 0.965 | 0.909 | 0.965 | 0.977 | 0.922 | 6.045    | 0.001 | 0.806             |
| <b>STE</b> | 0.083 | 0.987 | 0.910 | 0.923 | 0.987 | 0.912 | 3.436    | 0.032 | 0.796             |
| <b>CCO</b> | 0.071 | 0.911 | 0.924 | 0.909 | 0.923 | 0.987 | 5.081    | 0.017 | 0.932             |
| <b>CHF</b> | 0.082 | 0.989 | 0.990 | 0.943 | 0.998 | 0.934 | 5.876    | 0.009 | 0.889             |
| <b>EAC</b> | 0.050 | 0.954 | 0.908 | 0.917 | 0.955 | 0.912 | 8.011    | 0.000 | 0.966             |
| <b>BUC</b> | 0.063 | 0.900 | 0.967 | 0.960 | 0.944 | 0.933 | 4.413    | 0.045 | 0.817             |

Source: Generated by the author using SPSS Amos/Statistics, version 23-2026

### Structural model

The structural model results in Table 3 show the relationships between key variables influencing anti-corruption effectiveness, including strategies employed, institutional framework, collaboration, challenges, and bureaucratic corruption. Findings reveal that strategies employed significantly improve policy and institutional frameworks ( $\beta = 0.410$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), indicating that stronger strategies support institutional strengthening. However, strategies show a mixed effect on collaboration, with one relationship indicating a significant negative effect ( $\beta = -0.950$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and another a positive effect ( $\beta = 0.302$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), suggesting that some strategies may hinder cooperation while others enhance it depending on implementation. The policy and institutional framework has a positive but marginal effect on anti-corruption effectiveness ( $\beta = 0.626$ ,  $p \approx 0.054$ ), showing its importance despite borderline significance. Challenges faced significantly reduce effectiveness ( $\beta = -0.268$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), confirming that institutional, political, and operational constraints weaken anti-corruption outcomes. Further results show that strategies ( $\beta = 0.341$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and collaboration ( $\beta = 0.373$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) both significantly improve anti-corruption effectiveness, highlighting the importance of coordinated action and well-designed interventions. Finally, bureaucratic corruption negatively affects effectiveness ( $\beta = -0.343$ ,  $p = 0.029$ ), indicating that entrenched corruption undermines reform efforts. Therefore, the model demonstrates that anti-corruption effectiveness is driven by a combination of strong strategies, effective collaboration, and supportive institutions, while challenges and entrenched bureaucratic corruption significantly hinder progress.

**Table 3: Structural Model (Hypotheses Testing)**

|                                                                         | Coefficient | C.R  | p-value |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------|---------|
| Strategies Employed < -- Policy and Institutional Framework             | .410        | 5.43 | ****    |
| Collaboration and Cooperation <-- Strategies Employed                   | .950        | 3.32 | ****    |
| Collaboration and Cooperation <-- Strategies Employed                   | .302        | 4.30 | ****    |
| Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption <-- Policy and Institutional Framework | .626        | 4.65 | .0541   |
| Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption <-- Challenges Faced                   | -.268       | 6.40 | ****    |
| Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption <-- Strategies Employed                | .341        | 2.32 | ****    |
| Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption <-- Collaboration and Cooperation      | .373        | 4.30 | ****    |
| Bureaucratic Corruption Level <-- Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption      | -.343       | 2.72 | .0290   |

Source: Generated by the author using SPSS Amos/Statistics, version 23-2025

#### **4.1 Discussion of Findings**

The structural model results reveal that anti-corruption effectiveness is shaped by a combination of strategic, institutional, and contextual factors working together in complex and sometimes contrasting ways. The findings show that strategies employed play a key role in strengthening institutional structures and directly improving the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. This indicates that well-designed policies, enforcement mechanisms, and reform initiatives can significantly enhance institutional responsiveness and accountability. However, the relationship between strategies and collaboration and cooperation is mixed, suggesting that while some strategies encourage coordination among agencies and stakeholders, others may unintentionally create fragmentation, bureaucratic delays, or competition among institutions, thereby weakening collective action.

The policy and institutional framework also demonstrate a positive relationship with anti-corruption effectiveness, although the effect is only marginally significant. This suggests that while existing legal

and institutional arrangements are important, they may not yet be fully robust or consistently enforced to produce strong outcomes. It therefore points to the need for deeper institutional reforms, improved enforcement capacity, and reduced political interference to fully realize their potential impact.

Furthermore, collaboration and cooperation among stakeholders emerge as a strong and consistent determinant of anti-corruption success. The results highlight that when government agencies, oversight bodies, and other relevant actors work together through information sharing, joint operations, and coordinated monitoring, the overall effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives improves significantly. This underscores the importance of a unified and multi-agency approach in addressing corruption.

On the other hand, the study finds that challenges such as political interference, inadequate funding, weak institutional capacity, and systemic inefficiencies significantly reduce the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. These obstacles weaken implementation processes and limit the ability of agencies to function independently and efficiently. Similarly, bureaucratic corruption itself has a negative and significant effect on anti-corruption effectiveness, showing that entrenched corrupt practices within the public service continue to undermine reform efforts from within.

Therefore, the findings suggest that while effective strategies, strong institutional frameworks, and enhanced collaboration can significantly improve anti-corruption performance, these gains are continuously constrained by persistent structural challenges and deeply rooted bureaucratic corruption. This highlights the need for comprehensive and sustained reforms to achieve meaningful and lasting progress in anti-corruption efforts.

## **5.0 Conclusion**

This study examined the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures with a focus on the roles of strategies employed, policy and institutional frameworks, collaboration among stakeholders, prevailing challenges, and the level of bureaucratic corruption. The findings demonstrate that anti-corruption effectiveness is a multidimensional outcome shaped by the interaction of institutional strength, strategic interventions, and contextual realities within the public sector. The results confirm that well-designed strategies significantly enhance institutional performance and contribute directly to improved anti-corruption outcomes. Similarly, collaboration and cooperation among relevant stakeholders play a crucial role in strengthening enforcement and improving coordination across agencies. Although the policy and institutional framework show a positive influence, its marginal significance suggests that existing structures require further reinforcement to achieve optimal effectiveness.

However, the study also reveals that persistent challenges such as political interference, inadequate resources, and institutional weaknesses significantly undermine anti-corruption efforts. More critically, entrenched bureaucratic corruption continues to weaken reform initiatives, reduce

institutional credibility, and limit the overall impact of anti-corruption programmes. In conclusion, while Nigeria's anti-corruption framework demonstrates potential through strategic actions and collaborative efforts, its effectiveness remains constrained by deep-seated structural and institutional challenges. Achieving sustainable progress will therefore require stronger institutional independence, improved policy enforcement, enhanced inter-agency cooperation, and a sustained commitment to addressing bureaucratic corruption at all levels of governance.

## **6.0 Recommendations**

This study recommends the following thus

- i. The Adamawa State Government should review and enforce state anti-corruption laws, establish clear operational guidelines for agencies, and conduct periodic audits to enhance effectiveness.
- ii. The EFCC and ICPC should adopt modern investigative tools, provide regular training for staff, and intensify public awareness campaigns to encourage reporting of corrupt practices.
- iii. The Federal and State Governments should establish formal coordination platforms, facilitate Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) between EFCC, ICPC, and state agencies, and organize regular joint workshops to strengthen cooperation.
- iv. The Federal Government, through EFCC and ICPC, and the Adamawa State Government should ensure adequate funding, minimize political interference, expedite corruption cases through specialized courts, and promote community participation in anti-corruption initiatives.

## **References**

- Aduda, J. (2023). *Corruption and public sector accountability in developing economies*. Journal of Public Administration Studies.
- African Development Bank (AfDB). (2024). *Governance and corruption trends in Africa: Annual development report*. AfDB Publications.
- African Diaspora Initiative. (2023). *Corruption and governance challenges in Nigeria*. ADI Policy Brief.
- Agbu, O. (2020). *Political corruption and governance in Nigeria*. African Journal of Political Science.
- Azelama, J. U. (2023). *Ethics and corruption in organizational management*. Management Ethics Review.
- Bayley, D. (2021). *Corruption and the public service*. Public Administration Review.
- Bello-Imam, I. B. (2024). *Corruption and governance in Nigeria: Issues and perspectives*. Spectrum Books.
- Brooks, R. (2021). *Public integrity and corruption control mechanisms*. Governance and Society Journal.

- Creswell, J. W. (2020). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. Sage Publications.
- Debski, M., et al. (2020). *Institutional weakness and corruption dynamics in developing states*. Journal of Institutional Economics.
- DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (2021). *The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality*. Organizational Theory Review.
- Eisenhardt, K. M. (2020). *Agency theory: An assessment and review*. Academy of Management Review.
- Ekumankama, O. (2023). *Dimensions of corruption in public administration*. Nigerian Journal of Social Sciences.
- Igbaekemen, G. O., et al. (2020). *Understanding corruption and ethical violations in governance*. International Journal of Public Administration.
- Ijewereme, O. B. (2021). *Anti-corruption reforms in Nigeria: Progress and challenges*. African Security Review.
- Jamaican Commission for the Prevention of Corruption. (2020). *Annual report on public sector integrity*. Government of Jamaica.
- Kothari, C. R. (2021). *Research methodology: Methods and techniques*. New Age International.
- Krejcie, R. V., & Morgan, D. W. (1970). Determining sample size for research activities. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 30(3), 607-610.
- Luo, Y. (2024). *Institutional corruption and governance failure in emerging economies*. Global Governance Journal.
- Mohammed, A. (2021). *Corruption and development in Nigeria*. Northern Policy Studies.
- Njokuwu, C. (2023). *Ethics, accountability, and corruption control*. African Governance Review.
- Nye, J. S. (2020). *Corruption and political development: A cost-benefit analysis*. Political Science Quarterly.
- Olaniyan, A. (2020). *Bureaucratic corruption and public service delivery in Nigeria*. Journal of African Development Studies.
- Olowu, D. (2021). *Public administration and corruption in Africa*. African Administrative Studies.
- Onaiyekan, J. (2020). *Public corruption and governance ethics in Nigeria*. Catholic Social Thought Journal.
- Osoba, S. O. (2024). *Corruption in Nigeria: Historical and contemporary perspectives*. Nigerian Journal of History.
- Scott, W. R. (2021). *Institutions and organizations: Ideas, interests, and identities*. Sage Publications.
- Stensøta, H. O., et al. (2022). *Institutional trust and corruption perception*. Governance Studies Journal.

- Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2020). *Using multivariate statistics*. Pearson.
- Tanzi, V. (2020). *Corruption around the world: Causes, consequences, scope, and cures*. IMF Working Paper.
- Transparency International. (2022). *Corruption perceptions index 2022*. Transparency International.
- Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. (2020). *The institutionalization of institutional theory*. Sociology of Organizations.
- Vitta, R. (2020). *Governance and corruption in public administration*. Policy and Governance Review.
- Waziri, F. (2021). *Ethical misconduct and corruption in public institutions*. Journal of Ethics and Governance.
- World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. (2024). *Governance and anti-corruption evaluation report*. World Bank Publications.